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PerForMance Practices such as dance, theatre, rituals, popular en-
tertainments, sports, and professional rhetoric are key elements 
of many cultures [Bial 2007], each developed over centuries with 
varied functions attached to its different forms. Here, the focus is 
on classical dances and western definitions of theatre dance [Pavis 
1996]. While imitation has been suggested to play a central role in 
the making and receiving of dance [Laland et al . 2016: 5-9; Cohen 
1953: 232-236], it has become particularly evident over the last cen-
tury of research, that scientists, performers, and audiences have 
different modes of meaning-making in regards to dance. Dancers’ 
understanding can be best described as predominantly embod-
ied [Daly 2002], dancers are encouraged and have learnt to make 
meaning out of their dance experience. With adequate input and 
individuals’ reflective efforts, dancers’ meaning-making is also 
informed by conceptual knowledge [Moffett 2012: 1-6] and cul-
tural/socio-economic understanding [Sööt & Viskus 2013: 1193]. 
Audience members, who do not participate in dance themselves, 
can be expected to gain different forms of understanding, likely 
dependent on their individual motivations and tastes to see and 
experience dance [Reason and Reynolds 2010: 49-75]. Empirical ev-
idence showed indeed how audiences’ meaning-making is shaped 
by their personalities amongst other factors, such as their expertise 
as dance spectators and dance practitioners [Jola et al . 2014: 11].
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Meaning-making through scientific inquiry is strongly driven 
by a set of fundamental research principles. These principles set 
out a well-defined and, within the community, conscientiously 
shared conceptual (theoretical) and methodological approach 
to knowledge building. These principles have often been linked 
to discipline-specific paradigms, i.e., standards for the type of 
approaches that lead to recognized contributions in a specific 
field. One limitation of such paradigms is the reductionism in 
regard to the type of data and the type of stimuli used. The former 
relates to the idea that research has to take place within a certain 
methodology. For example, it has been postulated that research 
has either a qualitative or quantitative approach as the types of 
data cannot be mixed [Johnson et al . 2004: 14-26]. Reductionism in 
the stimuli used in experimental research is based on the assump-
tion that complex phenomena, such as for instance dance, can be 
understood by the analysis of their individual parts. Dissecting a 
phenomenon may support data clarity, enhances reliability of the 
data, and facilitates interpretation. Yet one could argue that due 
to the reduction of the stimulus complexity, interpretations and 
applicability of the research, findings are limited. For example, 
the meaning-making of dance by scientists could be deemed 
incomparable to the meaning-making by dancers and audiences 
due to the reductionist approach [Jola et al . 2012: 17-37]. One way 
to fully capture the phenomenon of dance would be to include 
the perspective of the scientists, the dancers, the audiences, as 
well as other dance related practitioners (i.e., the choreographer, 
the theatre directors, and so on, including the contexts). Here, the 
aim is not to provide a complete picture of meaning-making. The 
text focuses instead on the meaning-making of the scientist, from 
a critical perspective of the discipline of dance.
Since the seminal neuroscientific and behavioral studies using 
dance were published [Calvo-Merino et al . 2005: 1243-1249, Jola 
et al . 2005: 217-237] the number of experimental studies on the 
cognitive and neuronal signatures in the human brain associated 
with dance has increased tremendously. The majority of neu-
roscientific studies that investigated brain processes involved 
in watching dance emerged in the remit of the so-called «mir-
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ror-neuron mechanisms» and looked at the so-called «action 
observation» processes. A typical study for example compared 
dancers’ brain activity while they watched dance moves that they 
were physically familiar with to brain activity while watching 
dance moves with which they had little or no physical familiarity 
[Calvo-Merino et al . 2016: 1905-1910; Cross et al . 2006: 1257-1267; 
Cross et al . 2009: 315-326]. More recently, articles that relate to 
neurophysiological (e.g., respiration, heart rate, skin conduc-
tance) and/or cognitive benefits (e.g., spatial orientation, math-
ematical skills) based on dance training gained attention [Jola et 
al . 2017: 1-46].
Early neuroscientific studies that employed dance focused 
predominantly on western dance forms, such as classical ballet 
or contemporary dance [Orgs et . al . 2008] with the exception of 
Capoeira dance in the study by Calvo-Merino and colleagues 
[2006]. The spectrum of dance forms and critical considerations 
of socio-cultural and contextual appearances have since widened 
to social dances [Amoruso et al . 2014: 366-385], as well as dance 
forms from other cultures [Jola et al . 2012a]. It is important to 
note, however, that a critical discussion on the limitations of the 
scientific contrast of two dance styles such as by Brandon W. 
Shaw[forthcoming] is needed when comparing two dance styles, 
in particular if they are from different cultural backgrounds as in 
the study by Calvo-Merino and colleagues [2006] and in our own 
studies that compared spectators’ responses to Bharatanatyam, 
a classical Indian dance, and to Ballet [Jola et al . 2012a; Jola et al . 
2013: 90-98]. The latter points at another expansion of the content 
of the investigations by the sciences from dancers to other bodies 
involved in the performing arts: audiences [Jola et . al . 2012a; Jola 
and Grosbras 2013; Reason et al . 2016; Noble et . al . 2014; Grosbras, 
Tan & Pollick 2013; Herbec et al . 2015], choreographers [Stevens 
et al . 2010], as well as dance reviewers [Hee Jang & Pollick 
2011]. Across all of these studies, empirical challenges remain. 
Some issues relate to the intangible quality of on- and off-stage 
‘presence’, which is potentially one of the main reasons for the 
marginal number of empirical studies on cognitive and neuronal 
processes linked to theatre [Lippi et al . (forthcoming); Jola 2016; 
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Jola & Reason 2016]. In order to better understand the scientific 
mode of meaning-making, a more detailed but brief outline of the 
emergence of dance studies in the field of cognitive neuroscience 
is given below.
BackgroUnd Mirror neUrons
Over the past decade, dance has received increased attention in 
neuroscientific research based on a coincidental finding by an 
Italian research team. This group of scientists found that neu-
rons in motor areas of the monkey’s brain fire not only during 
motor execution, as was expected, but also during passive action 
observation, which was an unpredicted observation [Rizzolatti 
et al 1996: 131-141]. These neurons were described as «mirror 
neurons» because of their functionality to fire both during the 
execution of an action as well as during the passive observation 
of an action, as if the neurons were motorically «mirroring» the 
action seen. Mirror neurons were found to be spread over the 
fronto-premotor and parietal area with a density of one in three 
[Kilner at al . 2013]. Direct evidence (actual brain activity) in hu-
mans is present, yet limited [Halje et al . 2015: 206-214; Mukamel 
et al . 2010: 750-756]. This is due to the required non-invasive 
brain activity measurement in humans by means of for exam-
ple functional magnet resonance imaging (fMRI). In an fMRI 
experiment, the participant lies in a narrow tube (i.e., scanner) 
with a strong magnetic field. Protons in the human body align 
with the direction of this magnetic field. Their orientation is then 
further changed by applying energy through radio waves (RF 
pulses). After each pulse, protons realign to the magnetic field 
and release the energy applied. The time of the release after an 
RF pulse influences the strength of the signal that is measured 
as it differs dependent on the ratio of oxygenated (i.e., «fresh») 
to deoxygenated blood, thus giving an indication of the location 
of the most active areas in the brain, assuming active areas have 
higher oxygenated blood levels. While fMRI is a means to mea-
sure brain activity non-invasively, the interpretative steps and 
analytical tools from measurement to data interpretation (brain 
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activity) are not without criticism and potential faults [Logothetis 
et al . 2016: 7900-7905]. Also, the spatial restrictions of the machine 
allow only small movements of the hands or feet. To achieve 
3D models of the human brain activity, the head has to remain 
still and is thus immobilized throughout the scanning and whole 
body movements are not possible. Hence, most «mirror neu-
rons» research in humans presented video clips to the passive, 
immobile spectator, thus focusing on passive action observation 
without identifying mirror neurons through overlapping activi-
ty in response to action execution and action observation. Also, 
while the resolution of non-invasive techniques has increased 
over time, it is currently impossible to measure the activity of 
individual neurons. Hence, in humans, it is not mirror neurons 
but action observation networks that are studied, with some 
exceptions [Gazzola et al . 2009: 1239-1255].
Initially, the assumptions were that mirror neurons are 
dependent on a biological effector (e.g., hand, mouth) and an 
object (e.g., piece of fruit), in other words, an actor perform-
ing a gesture, for example, of eating. The actor (whose action 
is observed), the precise execution of the action itself, the live 
presence of the actor, and the context in which the action was 
executed were considered irrelevant to the firing of the mirror 
neurons during passive action observation. These are of course 
all hugely important factors in the performing arts. Yet over time, 
it was found that mirror neurons were sensitive to these elements 
as well [Rizzolatti et al . 2014: 1-12]. Moreover, varied research 
approaches found evidence in support of a modality-indepen-
dent system in the inferior frontal areas of the brain [Bachrach 
et al . 2016: 464-472], which shares the processing of performing, 
interpreting, and describing actions specifically and in different 
modalities (e.g., language, movement, music).
The discovery of mirror neurons was and still is intriguing 
for scientific endeavors as well as for the performing arts. Yet 
theoretical propositions including behavioral and neuronal ev-
idences of a close link between perception and action are not 
new [Gibson 1954: 304-314]. Mirror neurons can be considered 
part of the neurophysiological evidence of a shared mechanism 
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between perception and action [Van der Wel et al . 2013: 101-
113]. As evident from the above, they have certainly sparked 
the thinking about how we initiate, monitor, and interpret our 
own actions and how the actions of others affect us. The under-
standing that our ability to interpret the actions of others through 
our own motor system has gained in pertinence and opened the 
receptiveness of neuroscience to study and employ embodied 
practices, such as dance.
Clearly, the applied link between action execution and action 
observation is ever so relevant for theatre practice. It fosters nu-
merous yet unresolved questions regarding the power of the actor 
to captivate the audience through his or her actions [Sofia 2014: 
313-332] (see also chapter by Sofia in this edition). Of particular 
interest is how an actor can achieve «spontaneity» in a gesture 
and maintain this effect in the spectators’ reception despite having 
rehearsed and performed it numerous times. Other research that 
has evolved from the relationship between neuroscience and the-
atre is about actors training as a form of rehabilitation [Modugno 
et al . 2010: 2301-2313]. Moreover, the link to other modalities, such 
as language, music and conceptual/compositional perception 
are of relevance to the wider disciplines of the performing arts. 
The possibilities of gaining insight into what makes theatre work 
from a cognitive and neuroscientific point of view thus seem vast 
and yet utopian —due to the constraints of reductionist scientific 
paradigms as illustrated through the case of dance below.
considerations in eMPloying dance 
Early experiments employed dance stimuli to test the mirror-neu-
ron mechanism in an object-free context and evidence was report-
ed that mirror neurons in humans respond to passively observed 
dance movements without objects being presented [Bläsing et al . 
2012: 300-308; Sevdalis & Keller 2011: 231-236]. There are two 
considerations to be made underlying these findings.
Firstly, dance is a useful phenomenon to study the human 
brain and behavior while at the same time, it is a valuable sub-
ject of research in itself. Neuroscience predominantly employed 
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dance as a tool to better understand the human brain and behav-
ior. In some instances, however, the two approaches of mean-
ing-making have been confused, such as when neuroscientific 
findings lead to propositions on how to make dance. In addition, 
I argue that an in-depth understanding of dance as a subject is 
required in order to employ it correctly in empirical research, 
even if the focus is on scientific advancements and not the study 
of dance itself. For example, dance is practiced across nearly 
all cultures. If not endangered with extinction due to political, 
religious or economic threats, dance is a universally prevalent 
and continuing practice, often refined into formalized styles. For 
reasons of comparison and clarity, the formalized dance styles 
are ideal for scientific research. However, it requires an in-depth 
understanding of the cultural embeddedness of the dance forms 
that allow informed selection and careful description as shown 
in the earlier example that compared dancers’ brain responses 
watching capoeira with watching ballet moves.
Secondly, and as indicated above, most neuroscientific studies 
on brain activity while watching a dance performance, measure 
in fact passive action observation. Evidence of the mirror neuron 
network is therefore only partially provided. One of the under-
lying reasons is that movement during non-invasive brain mea-
surements is very limited and that brain activity measurements 
in a non-moving participant are more accurate than in a moving 
participant. Hence, only few neuroscientific studies compared 
dancers’ brain activity during action execution and action ob-
servation as would be required in the remit of mirror neurons 
[Brown et al . 2006: 1157-1167]. With recent methodological ad-
vances, such as wireless and affordable EEG technologies, more 
can be expected on this account. Moreover, in order to assess 
intricate differences in response to factors that are relevant in 
the performing arts, such as the presence of the performer, the 
structure of the movement sequence (or «movement phrase» in 
the dancer’s terminology), or the visual experience and/or indi-
vidual characteristics of an audience member, scientific studies 
are required to acknowledge dance stimuli that are of a lesser 




The impact of neuroscience research is often placed at an exces-
sively high level. A better understanding of the limitations of 
behavioral and neuroscientific approaches is therefore crucial 
to carefully interpret its findings. For instance, Cross and Ticini 
stated that «exploration of the neural mechanism associated with 
art appreciation, such as the biological reasons why certain works 
or performances are more popular than others, is undoubtedly 
of considerable artistic and commercial value» [Cross et al . 2006: 
1157-1167]. Although the authors refer to Chatterjee’s warning, 
that «it is critical for future studies in the neuro-aesthetic domain 
to be clear about what, precisely, neuroscientific data add to the 
study of aesthetics that behavioral experiments alone cannot 
achieve», a clear answer on what neuroscientific data add to a 
creative process is missing [Chatterjee 2011: 53-62]. There are 
several reasons to remain vigilant on the claims of what neuro-
science can contribute to the value of performing arts.
Above all, there is a general tendency to over-rate neuroscien-
tific findings as evidenced by Weisberg and colleagues [Skolnick 
et al . 2008: 470-477]. The authors showed that visual representa-
tions of brain activity influence the level of appreciation a reader 
has for research findings. In their study, participants were asked 
to read specifically constructed explanations for psychological 
phenomena with and without neuroscientific information. While 
all participants recognized what a good explanation of a research 
finding is, non-experts judged manuscripts that contained log-
ically irrelevant neuroscientific information as more satisfying 
than those without neuroscientific contents. Participants there-
fore highly valued neuroscientific information, although it was 
not adding any relevant content. The authors explain that the 
neuroscientific content seems to be masking otherwise salient 
issues in bad explanations. Basically, this means that by adding 
a picture of a brain or a neuroscientific statement, the value at-
tached to the writing has increased, whether the neuroscientific 
element contributes to the explanations or not. Hence, neurosci-
ence information can mislead non-expert readers’ understanding 
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of bad explanations and it is therefore crucial to remain critical of 
what is the information that neuroscience actually adds.
In view of scientific meaning-making through the use of dance, 
it is important to look at what dance is as a phenomenon. For 
example, dance is considered an ephemeral art form. Dance prac-
titioners are very much aware that dance changes, both over time 
and during the course of any given performance. This does not 
mean that dance is insubstantial or unserious but rather it empha-
sizes that «there is something vital about dance performances and 
events that disappears as it is being performed» [Bresnahan 2015]. 
Hence, when a dance performance is over, it generally leaves no 
artefact behind. At most, the dance lives on in the mind of the spec-
tator and the bodies of the performers for a limited period of time 
(one could argue that for both, spectators and performers, traces 
of the dance continue to resonate to some extent in the body and 
the mind). Imagine, for example, asking participants to verbally 
report on two contrasting types of performances while their brain 
activity is being measured. It would certainly be challenging to 
analyze and interpret the data. This is based on several factors, 
such as the individual timings of the verbal reports, the partic-
ipants’ varied vocabulary, their speech activity that is not part 
of the study’s interest, and the very individual experiences felt, 
remembered, and reported. However, considering what happens 
when we watch a dance performance on video, as has been done 
many times in the scanner, in which ways are these sensory and 
conceptual experiences affecting how dance is being seen? As 
these elements presumably vary hugely across individuals, brain 
imaging only allows interpretation of brain responses specific to 
the action contrast of the experiment itself (which is presumable 
the factor that is most salient across spectators). Yet this approach 
does not capture the lived experiences. 
On the one hand, researchers have done little so far to consider 
the philosophical element of the ephemeral nature of dance or 
to counteract the disappearance of the dances they have used 
as stimuli. The latter is particularly important in order to link 
future research to the past: stimuli used in scientific experiments 
are rarely available in full to readers, despite advances in online 
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technology. It begs the question how a movement that can be 
imagined with great difficulty on the basis of the description 
in a just published manuscript, can possibly be understood a 
few years later (considering that dance is a continuing, evolving 
phenomenon). Moreover, based on the knowledge of how much 
even relatively formalized styles of dance, such as ballet [Daprati 
et al . 2009: e5023] change over time, more attention should be 
drawn to how meaning-making from dancers, audiences, and 
dance scholars could be incorporated into scientific work.
On the other hand, if one were to acknowledge the importance 
of the ephemeral character of dance, studying responses to live 
performance would be the way forward. In line with the identi-
fied sensitivity of mirror neurons in response to live versus video 
presentations [Kilner et al . 2013], we found that novice spectators 
showed enhanced sensorimotor responses to live actions that are 
recognized as everyday gestures. This was true also for gestures 
that were culturally unfamiliar to its spectators. In other words, 
watching dance live may increase audiences’ meaning-making. 
Other studies using live versus TV presentations or stills (indepen-
dent of dance) showed similar findings with enhanced sensorimo-
tor responses to live compared to digital presentations [Pönkänen 
et al . 2011: 486-494; Shimada et al . 2006: 930-939]. Clearly, the com-
plexity of the visual environment and the spontaneity of a live 
performance is a challenge to the scientific paradigm of reliability 
(i.e., consistency of measurement), no one live performance is the 
same. However, the very factors of a live performance that can be 
considered a reduction of reliability (the performers’ variability) is 
at the same time a counteracting element (the performers’ ability 
to adjust performance to audience members’ engagement, timing 
of the day, and so on). However, due to convenience, funding 
limitations, and common scientific approaches to experimental 
research, dance is generally presented in form of digital stimuli.
Further, considering that there is often a big difference be-
tween a work of art and the representation of that work used for 
scientific research [Christensen et al . 2015: 223-252], readers and 
reviewers of neuroscientific publications should remain vigilant 
to this gap and its implications on the findings. One of the most 
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common and evident reductions is the presentation duration of 
the stimuli. Dance stimuli in neuroscientific studies are commonly 
of very short duration (e.g., often between 3 and 16 secs duration). 
It is obvious that audiences would not be happy to pay for a 
dance performance that is no more than a random appearance 
of 3 second actions. It is worth noting that most scientific experi-
ments do not consider dramaturgical or set design choice making 
processes. Under these circumstances, I argue that it is inappro-
priate to assume that the findings from neuroscience can have a 
considerable artistic and economic impact on dance. Although 
the claim is based on the assumption that research findings are 
representative and valid beyond the context of the experimental 
laboratory, it ignores findings that showed significant differences 
in spectators’ responses depending on the form of presentation. 
It should be noted that novel means of recording and analyzing 
complex brain imaging data have allowed to present participants 
with longer sequences of dance phrases. Overall, these studies em-
phasize that a coherent structure of the dance movements enhance 
the activity of the action observation network. The level of under-
standing on how the brain processes movement sequences and 
action chains does not yet add direct knowledge to the toolbox of 
an experienced dance maker. I would therefore argue that for the 
time being, it is predominantly dance that supports meaning-mak-
ing in science: i.e., the various styles of dance that inform science 
about scientific limitations, about human brain mechanisms, and 
how brain processes and socio-cultural phenomena may be linked.
tyPes oF cHallenges
Awareness of some of the methodological challenges in employing 
dance for scientific research discussed above have been raised in 
earlier publications on the coupling of dance and neuroscience [Jola 
et al . 2007: 62-67; Jola 2010: 203-234]. Despite criticism and glimpses 
of paradigm shifts within the sciences towards a more ecologically 
valid approach with methods, materials, and settings of a study 
being closer to the real-world phenomena examined [Risko et al . 
2012: 1-11; Redcay et al . 2010: 1639-1647], making sensible use of 
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dance to study the human brain and behavior remains a challenge 
(see Table 1). The issues outlined in Table 1 are not intended to 
be exhaustive but provide a selection of factors that influence the 
modes of meaning-making. The output forms may seem legitimate 
considering the very different discipline aims, however, it is one 
of the aspects that cause numerous challenges.
To facilitate the understanding of the challenges in combining 
dance and cognitive neuroscience, I propose to differentiate between 
soft and hard problems. Soft problems are differences between 
disciplines such as dance and neuroscience that can be overcome 
by individuals, such as breaking down language barriers, recogniz-
ing different types of knowledge, acknowledging and potentially 
softening discipline cultures, and increasing the understanding 
of dance from different perspectives. Hard problems, such as the 
ranking of disciplines’ output, the funding structures, the method-
ologies used, and the forms of dissemination are all closely linked 
to differences in output and take more time and effort for change 
to be implemented. It also requires a number of key experts to shift 
perceptions rather than a small group or individuals’ engagement.
Table 1. Selection of factors that identify differences between research in 
Cognitive Neuroscience and Dance.
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For example, although the number of interdisciplinary research 
collaborations has increased, the funding culture remains rigid. 
As has been shown for Australian applications, interdisciplinary 
research has had consistently lower funding success than basic 
research within a discipline [Bromhan 2016: 694-687]. With less 
funding, output and impact are more limited. Further, indicated 
in Table 1, scientists focus on peer reviewed manuscripts that are 
targeted at an expert readership. In contrast, dance aims to stage 
idiosyncratic performances and want to be inclusive, ideally, by 
reaching dancers and audiences across a wide socio-economic 
and cultural spectrum. There are other strings attached to re-
search output: most journals who follow a peer-review publica-
tion approach, have a so-called impact factor assigned, which is 
the average number of citations received per article published in 
that journal during preceding years. The more an article is cited, 
the higher its value is estimated and the more citations the articles 
in a journal receive, the higher is the impact value of the journal. 
Consequently, researchers want to publish in journals with a 
high impact factor. Yet impact factors are dependent on how 
many recorded publications appear within a given discipline and 
scientific journals achieve higher impact factors than for example 
journals in the social humanities, dance scholarship, or journals 
that are prepared to publish interdisciplinary work. Therefore, 
the estimated impact of an output is likely to remain lopsided.
Last but not least, an ever faster growing output leads to the 
impression of a production assembly line. To minimize criticism, 
it is convenient for scientists to conduct their research within the 
boundaries of established scientific paradigms, which are pre-
dominantly based on reductionist mechanisms. Hence, such an 
aligned approach enhances the speed of publication and a higher 
impact factor is more likely achievable. Yet this leaves little or 
no space for the non-intended to unfold. This is somewhat of 
a paradox, considering that the foundation of the exponential 
increase in dance and neuroscience studies is based on a coinci-
dental observation as described above.
In an attempt to allow the performing arts practice to achieve 
research status —as defined by established scientific disci-
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plines—, the term «Practice as Research» has been introduced 
[Nelson 2013]. While Practice as Research allows a theoretical 
framework to situate artistic practice within higher education, it 
can be considered an oddity: it is evident that artists who have 
created works of high artistic, historical, and cultural value, have 
always conducted research within their field. Similarly, dance as 
any other art form, has long done its own type of research before 
higher education accreditation. Moreover, science also has a «re-
search practice», but its practitioners generally do not reflect on it. 
A stronger focus on practice as research from within the sciences 
could potentially enhance ecological validity and aesthetic value 
by raising the awareness for participants’ experience. Notably, 
reflections on research practice have increased in the sciences, as 
evident for instance through the increased efforts to acknowledge 
and push for preregistration of studies. Notably, preregistration 
most beneficial to the more rigid paradigm-oriented reductionist 
experimental approaches and could potentially provide a false 
understanding of position as employed in explorative research. 
Moreover, while preregistering increases our trust in the hypoth-
esis testing, the process ignores potential pitfalls in ecological 
validity and increase the risk of crediting studies irrespective 
of their limited ecological value. As discussed above, effects of 
spectators’ individual experiences are recognized as modes of 
meaning-making in dance, hence, when dance is used for mean-
ing-making in the sciences, individual differences and factors of 
personality require consideration. 
Notably, one could argue that there is «no one dance» and 
there is «no one spectator» —which lets us step into the intricacies 
of art, and the common approach to meaning-making through 
«mean» calculations in the sciences.
oUtlook
Having presented my research at cross-disciplinary conferences 
for over more than fifteen years, it has become evident that the 
interest in and engagement with the mirror neuron concept has 
dramatically increased within the dance and theatre sector. Sim-
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ilarly, increasing numbers of individuals who work and research 
at the intersection of the performing arts and the cognitive neuro-
sciences have attended the manifold novel forms of workshops, 
conferences, and publications combining the performing arts 
and the sciences, thus enhancing the understanding across the 
fields. The introduction on the neuroscientific background has 
thus been kept deliberately short here and the interested reader 
is recommended to consult the literature beyond this chapter 
[Sevdalis & Keller 2011; Bläsing et al . 2012; Johnson & Shiffar 
2013; Karpati et al . 2015]..
A central question for future of cross-disciplinary research 
proposedly is: how does an ideal performing art-science project 
look like? To plough a path through the muddle of challenges I 
proposed that the parties continue with combined efforts, name-
ly that scientists embody dance, that artists engage with science, 
and that audiences participate as researchers. To describe these 
activities, I suggested the terms experimental choreography and 
embodied neuroscience. With experimental in experimental chore-
ography, I do not refer to its common use of trial and error, but 
the sense of performances designed in an experimental way that 
entails at the same time artistic and scientific value. The latter, 
embodied neuroscience, asks the researcher to take part in the phys-
ical practice of his research object. The rationale is that the study 
is grounded on experiential knowledge in order to inform what 
aspects of which type of dance are relevant to not strip off the 
form for reductionist arguments. Challenges are still well known: 
experimental choreography requires a funding structure that is 
uncommon for scientific research and embodied neuroscience 
works against the scientific discipline culture in terms of social 
interaction as well as the pressure to publish or perish. 
To conclude, understanding the different meaning-makings 
of the scientist, the practitioner and the audience, where could 
neuroscience meet theatre practice? The meeting point of theatre 
practice and neuroscience has followed a different historical tra-
jectory from the coupling of dance and neuroscience: the neuro-
scientific stance within the acting discipline started in pedagogy 
and education — it is just that it coincided with mirror neuron 
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findings. Hence, according to Sofia, the investigations were 
spread broader from the beginning (i.e., with four trajectories: 
physiology of action, physiology of emotions, ethology, and 
studies on spectator’s perception). At present, effects of training 
do have a strong position in the performing arts —even if it is 
limited to making use of the spark that neuroscience creates to 
think and reflect, without adding any direct relevant information 
(if one were to remain aware of the difference between adding 
knowledge and supporting the creation of knowledge). It can 
be hoped that in a second and third step, neuroscience may ap-
proach and reveal existing myths in theatre and with it advance 
the future of dance-neuroscience research.
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